Estimating the effect of tax reform in differentiated product oligopolistic markets Fershtman, C.; Gandal, N.; Markovich, S.
Introduction:
The incidence of taxation and the design of an optimal tax system have been extensively discussed in the Public Finance literature; most of the work on this subject has been conducted within the framework of a competitive market or within the framework of a homogenous good oligopoly characterized by Cournot competition. Auerbach (1985) provides a good theoretical survey on commodity taxation in competitive markets. Katz and Rosen (1985) , Myles (1987) , and Stern (1987) examine commodity taxation issues such as tax design, optimal taxes and tax incidence in oligopolies in which firms compete on quantities and sell homogeneous products. In this papQr we examine, both theoretically and empirically, the issues of tax reform in a very relevant market: oligopoly markets in which firms sell differentiated products.
In an oligopoly, in which products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically, the effect of taxation may be complex since the tax regime may affect not only the prices, but also the profile and quality of the products that each firm sells.
In order to illustrate the complex effect of taxation on a differentiated good oligopoly, consider the automobile industry. Let us assume that in the relevant market, there are several firms that sell automobiles. Each of the firms sells different models. The models are vertically differentiated in that they differ in size, quality, features etc. At any given point in time these firms compete in prices. The price vector determines how many cars of each model are sold. In detemlining the price for a specific model, each firm must take into account competition from other firms as well as the effect of the price of a particular model on its other models. Now assume that a tax is imposed. This will change the market equilibrium and will affect not just the prices of cars but also the equilibrium z distribution of cars that each firm sells. In particular, it is possible that a uniform increase in the tax rate, while reducing overall sales in the market and overall sales of a particular firm, may increase sales of particulaz model. Such an effect will occur if, for example, as a result of the tax increase there is a shift in sales to smaller cars.
This paper examines taxation issues in an oligopolistic mazket with horizontally and vertically differentiated products in which firms (may) sell multiple brands. While we apply our framework to the automobile market in Israel, the type of analysis we employ is applicable to other differentiated product oligopolies. The paper investigates the effect of changes in the taxation regime on equilibrium prices, the size and composition of the market, consumer surplus, government tax revenues, and firm profits.
In our analysis, we employ recent advances in estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. These techniques, developed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , enable structural estimation of both the demand and oligopoly pricing aspects that characterize difierentiated products. The model of oligopolistic competitíon that we employ is based on Berry (1994) and is similar to the one used by Verboven (1996) and the one used in our previous work (Fershtman and Gandal (]998)).~We use the model and data on prices, quantities, and characteristics for 1994 and 1995 (the latest years for which the data are available) to estimate the demand and cost parameters for this market.
Given the estimated parameters, we analyze the effects of different tax regimes by simulating the market equilibrium under such regimes. Currently the retaíl price in Israel includes three types of taxes (a luxury tax, a value-added tax, and custom duties). Total 3 taxes are 144 percent on automobiles subject to custom duties (automobiles manufactured in Japan and Korea) , and 128 percent on automobiles not subject to custom duties (automobiles manufactured in the United States or European countries). We investigate the effect of three possible tax refotms that are, or were, under consideration in Israel.
The first reform makes taxation uniform (at 128 percent) for all producers by eliminating custom duties.2 The second reform is an increase in taxes so that there is a 145a~o uniform tax rate, whife the third reform is a reduction in the tax rate so that the uniform tax rate is 1000~0 . We analyze the effect of these taxation regimes on the number of cars sold in the market, the distribution of types and models of cazs sold in the market, prices, and market shares of different manufacturers, as well as on government tax revenues, and firm profits.
We are aware of two purely theoretical papers that examine the effect of taxation in differentiated product oligopolies. Gruenspecht (1988) considers the effect of export subsidies in an oligopoly in which firms sell horizontally difierentiated products and compete on prices. In his model, price reductions do not bring new customers into the market; they only lead to market diversion from other competitors. Our setting explicitly allows for both effects and we measure them Cremer and Thisse (1994) examine the effect of commodity taxation in a setting in which firms sell vertically differentiated products and compete on prices. They show that an increase in taxes reduces the quality of the products that oligopolists will provide. Although we assume that the brands offered are fixed in the short run, our empirical results indeed show that, in the spirit of ' In Fershtman and Gandal (1998) , we examined Ne effect of the Arab economic boycott on the IsraeG automobile industry and estimated the peace dividend (in this indusuy) associated with the eliminauon of the boycott.
a Cremer and Thisse (1994) , increases in taxes lead to a shift in the distribution of sales to smaller and lower quality cars.
Empirical work in the literature has almost exclusively been conducted under the assumption that the relevant industry is competitive. Kenkel (1996) examines the optimal rate of taxation on alcohol. In his setting, he assumes that there is a single "alcoholic"
product that is priced at marginal cost. He acknowledges that the "alcoholic beverage industry is probably better described as oligopolistic, but the implications for tax incidence are unclear" (Kenkel (1996) p. 300). Our methodology allows examination of tax incidence in differentiated product oligopolies.
To the best of our knowledge, Barnett, Keeler, and Hu (1995) is the only paper that employs an oligopoly model to examine the efiect of taxation. Using a Cournot model with homogeneous products to model competition among manufacturers in the cigarette industry, they examine the incidence of cigarette taxes. Using the estimated parameters, they simulate the effect of changes in the rate of cigarette taxation. Given that there is not a great deal of vertical differentiation among the popular cigarette brands, the homogeneous Cournot model is probably a reasonable model to use ín their setting.
In the automobile market in Israel, the price among the available models ranges in 1995 from 514,833 for a Fiat Uno (a 1.1 Liter engine with a standard transmission and no air-conditioning) to 564,987 for a Volvo 960 (a 3.0 liter engine, air-conditioning, automatic transmission, airbags, ABS brakes, and other premium features). Clearly, we cannot model competition in this industry by employing a Cournot model with homogeneous products.
The Oligopolistic Model
We model the automobile industry as an oligopolistic market with N multiproduct firms. Short run competition among the firms is through prices. Market demand is detertnined by aggregating a discrete choice model of consumer behavior.
Demand
Following Berry (1994), we use a random utility model, in which the utility of producij to consumer i, u~, is:
where z~is a vector of observed product characteristics (such as engine size) and p~is the price of automobile j. a and~i are parameters to be estimated. The last two terms of (1) are error terms:~~is the average value of product j's unobserved characteristics (and is the same for all consumers) and s;~represents the distribution of consumer preferences around this mean. The term e~introduces heterogeneity and its distribution determines the substitution patterns among products. Under the assumption that the e,~are identically and independently distributed across consumers and products with the extreme value (Weibull) distribution function, the probability of choosing product j(the market share of product j) is given by:
is the mean utility level from product j. It is well known that this "logit" distribution yields unreasonable substitution pattems among products;' it is commonly used because it yields a closed form solution for the market share of each product.
In order to overcome the unreasonable substitution patterns, similar to other authors, we employ the "nested" multinomial logit model. Goldberg (1995) and Verboven (1996) also employ variants of the nested logit model in their studies of the automobile industry. This structure yields a much more reasonable pattern of substitution among products.
As Beny (1994) notes, the nested logit is appropriate when the substitution effects among produas depend primarily on predetermined classes of products. This assumption seems reasonable in the case of automobiles; indeed industry groups employ a standard classification system that puts each car in one of the following groups: subcompact, compact, midsize, large, and luxurylsport, according to its characteristics.
In the nested logit model, the products are grouped into Gtl sets, where the outside good, j-0, is assumed to be the only member of group 0. The difference between the logit and the nested logit is that there is an additional variable, denoted~, which is ' For more on general erveme value (GEV) models, see McFadden (1978) . common to all products in group g and has a distribution that depends on a, 0~Q~I. In the case of the nested logit model, the utility of consumer i from product j is u~-8~t S;~t(1-Q)e~, where 8, -x,~i -áp, t~, is again the mean utility level and S t(1-Q)s also has an extreme value (Weibull) distribution. In this case, the probability of choosing product j in group g is:
where D-~e6'~"-'~, G denotes the set of automobiles of t e 8~r~g yp g, and 0~v~1 is an additional parameter to be estimated; it measures the degree of substitution among the products in the classes or groups. If 6-0, the cross elasticities among products do not depend on the classification; in this case, the simple multinomial logit model (Eq. (1)) is appropriate. When a~0, there is a higher degree of substitution among cars that belong to the same group than among cars from different groups. If 6 approaches one, the cross elasticity between any two cars that belong to different groups approaches zero.
We use the nested logit model to estimate the equilibrium in the Israeli automobile market. As shown in Berry (1994) , Eq. (4) can be inverted to yield the following equation:
where s,,p is the share of product j in group g, and so is the proportion of consumers that choose not to purchase a new car, that is, the proportion of consumers that choose the outside good. Following the literature, we assume that the size of the potential market is known; so is then the difference between the size of the potential market and the actual market. Since the price and the group share are endogenous, we can obtain consistent estimates of a, a and a from an instrumental variable regression.
Multiproduct Oligopoly Pricing
We assume that the marginal cost of producing each product is independent of the output levels and linear in a vector of cost characteristics. The assumption of constant marginal cost is typically employed in the relevant literature. Moreover, since the Israeli automobile market is small compared to the world market, the assumption of constant marginal cost is quite realistic in this case. The marginal cost of good j is:
where m~is a vector of observable characteristics, u~is an unobserved cost characteristic and y is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
The operating profits of a multiproduct firm j selling F different types of automobiles are:
where pk is the retail price of product k, qk is the corresponding quantity sold, t is the tax rate, and mck is the mazginal cost of producing automobile k.
We assume that firms compete through prices and that they only take into account the cross elasticities among their products within a group. It can be shown (with a lot of tedious algebra -see Verboven (1996) ) -that the first order condition (pricing equation)
for product j is:
Instruments
We need to specify instruments for both the demand and the pricing equations.
The endogenous terms for which we need instruments are product shares within a group (s,~p -q~IQj) , firm shares within a group, (~k~~qt IQY ), and prices. We use the characteristics of other cars and cost shifters as instruments.
The number of other products in a group and the sum of the characteristics of other products in a group are negatively correlated with within-group shares, and therefore can be used as instruments for this variable. Now consider firm shares within a group. This variable is positively correlated with the number of other products the firm sells in the group and with the sum of the characteristics of the other cars it sells in the group. Further, firm shares within a group are negatively correlated with the number of products sold by competitors in the group, and with the sum of characteristics of products sold by competitors in the group. Finally, we consider instruments for price. The pricing equation suggests that an increase in the number of other automobiles that a firm sells within the group will increase the price. An important additional instrument for price is the change in the exchange rate between 1994 and 1995.'
Data
In the Israeli market the luxury~sport class is extremely small (due to the relatively high rate of taxation); hence we employ the classes: subcompact, compact, midsize and Automobiles from Japan and South Korea are not exempt from custom duties.
Our data includes the variable ENGINE, which is the engine size in liters, and the dummy variables SUBCOMPACT, COMPACT, MIDSIZE and LARGE; these variables take on the value one if the automobile belongs to one of these classes. The dummy
variables AIRCONDITION and AUTOMATIC take on the value one if the model has air conditioning or automatic transmission ( respectively). AIRBRAKE takes on the value
' OC course, all of the instruments are valid for all of the endogenous variables; we discuss the insvuments in this manner so that we can provide the economic intuition behind the choíce of instruments. Models with did'erent engine size are different products. o The average exchange rate in both 1994 and 1995 was 3.00 New Istaeli Shekels -S 1.00.
In the Israeli market, many premium feattues pike dual airbags. automatic transmission, autornatic braking system (ABS) etc.) are included as standard equipment or not available. The instruments we employ aze the sum of the engine sizes of the other products in the group, the sum of the engine sizes of the other products that a firm sells in the group, the number of other products in the group, the number of other products that a firm sells in the group, and the change in the exchange rate between 1994 and 1995. The results of the GMM estimation aze shown The estimates of the marginal cost of air conditioning and automatic transmission are in line with the option prices that are listed separately in the Levi price book (Recall that the prices are in New Israeli Shekels.) In addition the model predicts that the marginal cost of producing French, German and Japanese automobiles increased significantly in 1995 relative to the typical 1994 automobile; these increases were primarily due to significant appreciation of the French, German, and Japanese currencies against the New Israeli Shekel. The estimated elasticities of demand also seem quite IS plausible: the average (sales weighted) elasticity of demand is -3.53 for the subcompact class, -4.70 for the compact class, -5.62 for the midsize class, and -9.15 for the large class.
The model also predicts that similar to the U.S., there is some market power in the Israeli automobile market: the average (sales weighted) price-cost margin is 10 percent. This is slightly lower than the price-cost margins obtained by BLP (1995) for the U.S.
automobile industry.
The Effects of Changes in the Tax Regime.
Given the parameters estimated in the previous section we will now analyze the efiects of different tax regimes by simulating the equilibrium of the oligopolistic market equilibrium under different tax and custom regimes d.l Eliminating Custom Duties on Japanese and Korean cars.
As we noted before the custom duties in Israel are such that the Japanese and the Korean (JBzK) cars are subject to a l44"~o tax rate, which includes luxury tax, value added (sales) tax and customs; European and American cars are subject to a 128"~o tax rate. Our first experiment is to analyze the effect of eliminating customs duties, i.e., imposing a uniform tax rate of 1280~o for all automobiles imported to Israel. Since Israel is now a signatory to the GATT, it suggests that the custom duties will be eliminated in the near future Our market simulation indicates that eliminating custom duties increases the market size by 2.30~0, while government revenues from taxes decrease by 1.80~0. The The elimínation of the custom tax leads to an increase in the share of JBzK automobiles in each class while the share of European and American (EBcUS) decreases.
Custom elimination implies a 6.60~o reduction in the tax burden (for Japanese and Korean vehicles), where we define the tax burden to be the percentage change in prices such that the dealer price pl(ltt) is unchanged before and after the tax change. The simulation shows that Japanese and Korean firms would lower prices in the 4.1"~0-5.80~o range, following the elimination of custom duties. This implies that part of the tax reduction is passed onto consumers. The consumers' share of the tax reduction is higher in the larger classes.
The elimination of custom duties has a significant effect on the profits of the different firms. The profits of American and European manufacturers fall by 4-10 percent, while the profits of the Japanese and Korean firms rise by anywhere from 20-33 percent. Honda has the largest increase in profits (330~0); this is because their models are in the midsize and large classes. Thus despite the fact that the distribution of sales among classes does not change significantly (Table 2) , the distribution of sales (and profits) within classes changes significantly. Table 5 4.2 Increasing the Luxury Taz so that there is a 145"~. Uniform Taz .
Our next exercise is increasing the luxury tax so that there is a 1450~o uniform tax on all automobiles. Simulating the new market equilibrium shows that there would be a 5.80~o reduction in the number of cars sold in Israel, relative to the number of cars that would be sold under a 1280~o uniform tax. The increase in overall taxes increases prices of all cars, and therefore encourages consumers to buy smaller cars. The leftward shift of consumers towards cars that belong to the subcompact class can be seen in Table 6 , which shows the distribution of car sales among the groups. Table 7 .
Subcompact Compact Midsize Large Total
Changes following the increase in theluxury tax Total Firms' Profits ( Millions i) }60 3 t25.5 Table 9 .
zo 5. The Effect of the Tax Rate on Tax Revenues, Market size, etc.
In this section, we simulate the equilibrium for uniform tax rates in the 100"~0-160"~o range and calculate the associated tax revenues. Figure 1 shows how the tax revenues by class change over the range of tax rates. Figure 2 shows how firms' profits change as the tax rate increases from 100"~o to 160"~0. The profile of the automobiles sold in the market would likely be different at the lower end of the range than at the higher end of the tax range.
An examination of individual models shows that the number of Buick LeSabres, Chrysler Visions and Volvo 960s fall by more than 700~o as the tax rate increases to 1600~0. These are among the largest and most expensive models available in the Israeli market today. If the tax rate did increase to 160"~0, it is likely that these models would not be available in Israel.
In figure 3 , we graph the market size (for each group) as a function of the tax rate An increase in the tax rate from 100"~o to 160"~o percent reduces the market size by 19"~0; more importantly, it significantly shifts the distribution of sales to the subcompact and compact categories. Such an increase in the tax rate significantly reduces sales of lazge automobiles: its sales fall by 36"~0. The size of the midsize class also falls significantly (by 23.20~0). The size of the subcompact and compact class declines by much less: 17.80~0
for the compact class and 11.3 percent for the subcompact class.
Concluding Remarks
While the paper examines the effect of different tax regimes on the Israeli automobile market, the main contribution of this paper is the methodology it employs. As 21 we demonstrated, our framework provides a methodology for examining the effects of changes in tax regimes in differentiated product oligopolies. As we have shown, in such industries taxation affects the profile of goods that are sold as well as relative prices in a way that depends on the elasticity of demand of all products and the degree of competition in the market.
The methodology we developed provides regulators with an instrument to predict the effect of different tax policies not only on tax revenues and the number of cars that are sold in the market, but also on the dístribution of the type of automobiles that are sold; hence different tax regimes can be evaluated and compared for their effect on the average engine size (which determines the consumption of fuel), the percentage of automobiles that offer safety features (such as Airbags and ABS brakes), as well as the level of imports. 
